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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy scholars have long recognized and documented the
shortcomings of the fair information practice principles (herein “FIPPs”) of
“notice, choice and consent” approach to protect information privacy. These
shortcomings are even more pronounced in today’s political and social world
for three reasons. First, big data and its concomitant algorithmic power have
radically changed the nature and effects of personal information processing,
challenging FIPPs style regulation in fundamental ways. Second, the broad
recognition of the social importance of privacy, especially its importance to
* Priscilla M. Regan is a Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George
Mason University. Prior to that, she was a Senior Analyst at the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment. 1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Amsterdam
Privacy Conference in October 2018 and the Privacy Law Scholars Conference in May 2019.
The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments received at these conferences
from Lisa Austin, Jacquelyn Burkell, Julie Cohen, Bob Gellman, Woody Hartzog, Sarah Igo,
Cameron Kerry, Siona Listokin-Smith, Mary Madden, Bill McGeveran, Deirdre Mulligan,
Kobbi Nissim, Jim Rule and Valerie Steeves. The author also appreciates the research
assistance of Caroline Ball, an MPA student at George Mason University.
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democracy, undercuts the rationale for an individual rights approach and
renders FIPPs even more problematic. Third, the emergence of large internet
platforms controlling how individuals experience social, political, and
economic life has rendered a FIPPs approach to protecting privacy obsolete
and ineffective. Several scholars have examined the rationale for and
potential effectiveness of policy alternatives to FIPPs, including alternatives
such as an anti-trust approach or regulation modeled on environmental
regulation. In a 2017 essay in the Maryland Law Review, I provided a
preliminary investigation of whether and how the public trustee concept
might be applied to information privacy policy. In that piece, as here, I was
using the term “public trustee”2 in its broadest sense to represent a position
of trust with a legal obligation to use its powers solely for the benefit of the
public—in this case, that personal data would be used in a fair and
responsible manner. My thinking paralleled that of others arguing that an
individual rights approach to privacy protection was ineffective and that
instead, obligations should be placed on those organizations collecting and
using data. Neil Richards and Woody Hartzog emphasized the importance
of “trust,”3 while Jack Balkin and Lindsey Barrett spoke of “information
fiduciaries.”4 At the same time that scholars and policymakers are exploring
policy alternatives to FIPPs, larger issues regarding the power of major
internet actors (ISPs and platforms/edge players) and their lack of
accountability to the public have surfaced. Most recently, this has arisen in
the context of “fake news,” the explosion of biased and inaccurate
information on the internet and its effect on public discourse and democratic
participation, as well as the implications of reversing net neutrality
regulations.
This tide of current events has brought attention to the fact that the
fundamental policy problem regarding today’s major internet actors is
“private power and American democracy.”5 During the transition from a
largely agricultural based economy to an industrial based economy, a
number of regulatory regimes, rationales and institutions (e.g., anti-trust,
public utilities, common carriers, consumer protection) were developed to
control the negative effects of the private power exercised by major
2
See generally Priscilla M. Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying
it to Information Privacy Policy, 76 MARYLAND L. REV. 1025 (2017).
3
See generally Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L REV. 431–472 (2016); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s
Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L. J. 1180 (2017).
4
See generally Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185 (2016); Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law,
the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE L. REV. 1057 (2019).
5
GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, New York:
Knopf (1966).
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economic actors of that time (e.g., railroads, communication companies). To
a large extent, and not surprisingly, current discussions about possible policy
solutions to the problems posed by new actors wielding private power in
democratic systems have tended to use the frameworks and ideas of earlier
policy eras. But, as has also been recognized in policy discussions regarding
information privacy and organizational interests, pouring new wine into old
bottles is not always effective.6 The limitations of the regulatory regimes of
the industrial age to that of the information age are increasingly recognized
and a range of scholars are exploring alternative regulatory schemes.7
At this time, there are three primary arguments being offered in current
policy discussions regarding the rationales to curb the private power wielded
over internet-based activities: (1) the real or potential anti-competitive
behavior of key internet gatekeepers; (2) the commodification of personal
information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions; and (3) the explosion of fake
news or inaccurate and biased information particularly on social media sites.
The debate on the first is focused on the policy solution of net neutrality.
The debate on the second in the U.S. has focused on rethinking a sectoral
FIPPs approach as well as a self-regulatory approach. Last, the debate on
the third raises questions of censorship and First Amendment conflicts.
In this paper, I focus on the synergy that exists among the three
rationales being offered for regulating internet-based actors and on the
underlying problem of private power on the internet, a power that is fueled
by personal information. I argue that if policymakers resolve the information
privacy question effectively, that will, at a minimum, mitigate the problems
of fake news and misinformation, which is highly dependent upon easy
access to information about individuals’ consumer practices, activities,
interests, philosophical leanings/orientations, etc., so that messages can be
targeted to particular subgroups in the population. If access to such data is
removed, it becomes far more difficult to target messages. At the same time
if policymakers resolve the information privacy question, that will also
reduce the control and discretion that major internet actors gain from the
personal information they have access to and will decrease one element of
their competitive advantage. Given that leverage, it seems that establishing
6

Horace E. Anderson, Jr., The Privacy Gambit: Toward A Game Theoretic Approach
to International Data Protection, 9 VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 11 (2006).
7
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State in the Information Age, 17
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 369 (2016); Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133 (2017); Orly Lobel, Law of the Platform, 101 MINN L. REV. 87
(2016); Hal J. Singer, Paid Prioritization and Zero Rating: Why Antitrust Cannot Reach the
Part of Net Neutrality Everyone is Concerned About, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, 1;
Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, 2 AM. AFF. 3-16 (2018); K.
Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New
Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234 (2018).
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an effective scheme to protect information privacy should be a priority.
Further, this paper expands upon my earlier analysis of the applicability
of a public trustee scheme or regulation and explores how a public trustee
based regulatory regime might be designed in an era of big data and how it
might be presented to gain political support. The paper first briefly examines
the three reasons that the FIPPs approach is no longer applicable or effective
in today’s personal information environment. Second, the paper reviews the
current debate about regulating private power on the internet. Third, it
provides an explanation for why resolving privacy issues will also reduce
fake news and misinformation problems without censorship of information
and may also mitigate some of the issues associated with anti-competitive
behavior. Finally, this paper explores how and why a public trustee based
regulatory regime is relevant in this area of controlling private power in a
democracy and proposes institutional design features for an agency based on
public trustee principles that might reduce the possibility for industry capture
and over-politicization.
II. INADEQUACY OF FIPPS APPROACH
The traditional FIPPs approach to protecting privacy, similarly,
enshrined in information privacy policies in virtually all countries with such
policies—albeit with different schemes for enforcement—is primarily aimed
at providing individuals with the means to protect their own privacy. For
many years, scholars, privacy advocates, and policymakers have questioned
the effectiveness of this approach, especially when enforcement relies on
individual initiative and is not supplemented with agency action.8 Survey
research and precepts of behavioral economics support the finding that
people do not read privacy notices informing individuals of organizational
information practices.9 The problems and shortcomings of the FIPPs
approach have been well documented, but recently are receiving renewed,
and more serious, attention for three reasons.
First, big data and algorithmic power have changed the nature and
effects of personal information processing in ways that fundamentally
8

See generally PRISCILA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (UNC Press, 1995); Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented,
Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and
Institutions, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 199 (1993); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State,
32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (2000); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy SelfManagement and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880–81 (2013); Jeff
Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1038 (1999).
9
See generally Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading
Privacy Policies, 4 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); Alessandro Acquisti, The
Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 76 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
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challenge FIPPs-style regulation. The advent of big data and use of
algorithms coupled with machine learning have generated scores of social
science and law review articles pointing out the various effects of these
developments on information privacy generally, and on existing regulations
protecting privacy.10 The techniques associated with big data enable new
tools for generating data, designing data sets, culling the data for patterns
and trends, and identifying either individual or group prototypes of behavior.
Not only does big data entail collection and analysis of more and more
refined data without individual knowledge, but big data also expands the
power to influence, and restricts and predicts individuals’ actions and the
opportunities presented to an individual.11 Privacy problems include
controlling the collection and use of information about oneself, autonomy
over decision-making, anonymity, choice in group associations, and
discrimination or bias in decisions—raising not only classic FIPPs values of
consent, choice, and transparency, but equally importantly related values of
due process, equal protection, data security, and accountability.
Second, the broad recognition of the social importance of privacy,
especially its importance to democracy, renders the FIPPs approach even
more problematic. Since the mid-1990s, scholars across a number of
disciplines have drawn attention to the reality that privacy is not just
important to individuals but also critically important to society as a whole.12
Recent developments over the last several years have underscored privacy’s
importance as a public value and its critical importance to democratic
10

See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 153 (Houghton
Mifflin Harcourt, 2013); JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER, & HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT,
xi (Cambridge U. Press, 2014); JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER, & HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT,
xi (Cambridge U. Press, 2014); Paul Ohm, The Underwhelming Benefits of Big Data, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 339, 339–340 (2013); Jules Polonetsky & Omer Tene, Privacy and Big Data:
Making Ends Meet, 66 STAN. L. REV. 25, 25 (2013); Priscilla M. Regan, Big Data and Privacy,
in ANALYTICS, POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 204 (Jennifer Bachner, Benjamin Ginsberg, &
Kathryn Wagner Hill eds., 2017); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate
Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671, 671–72 (2016); Lisa M. Austin, Towards a Public Law of
Privacy: Meeting the Big Data Challenge, 71 SUP. CT. L. REV. 540, 543 (2015).
11
Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data
Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66 (2013).
12
See generally REGAN, supra note 8, at xiv; BEATE RÖSSLER, THE VALUE OF PRIVACY
1 (R.D.V. Glasgow trans., 2005); Valerie Steeves, Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy, in
LESSONS FROM THE IDENTITY TRAIL: ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND IDENTITY IN A NETWORKED
SOCIETY 191–208 (Kerr et al. eds., 2009); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, ix
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2008); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW,
CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 1 (Yale Univ. Press, 2012); HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL
LIFE 3 (Stanford Univ. Press, 2010).
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participation. Across the globe, more sophisticated collection and analysis
of personal information by candidates, political parties, and interest groups
have fostered polarization and partisanship.13 Segmentation and the
targeting of political messages to selected subgroups of the population
undermine traditional notions of “the public” or a “body politic” which are
fundamental to democratic citizenship. If information privacy is important
to maintaining the integrity of the public in a democratic system of
government, then a policy approach based on individual choice and consent
is not an appropriate policy remedy.
Third, the emergence of large internet platforms controlling how
individuals experience social, political, and economic life has rendered a
FIPPs approach to protecting privacy obsolete and ineffective. There is
growing recognition that the complex socio-technical systems on which
much of modern life is organized are now exhibiting attributes of public
infrastructures.14 Alice Marwick and Danah Boyd see these technological
shifts in the information and cultural landscapes creating “networked
publics”15 and necessitating a conceptualization of privacy that moves
beyond an individualistic approach. Facebook, Google, and Amazon are the
primary examples of the importance of socio-technical systems whose
complex architectures and business models, scale and reach of their
operations, and the huge number of people worldwide who use these systems
underscore their infrastructural characteristics. Under these circumstances,
privacy has to be established as a component of the network or infrastructure,
including the various databases and interconnections that compose the
network, and privacy is shared collectively by those in the network.16
III. ARGUMENTS FOR REGULATING PRIVATE POWER ON THE INTERNET
There are three primary arguments being offered today to curb the
private power wielded over internet-based activities. These arguments are
to some extent occurring on parallel tracks as they represent different, but
arguably intersecting, concerns about aspects of the power of internet actors
13

Colin J. Bennett, Voter databases, Micro-targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can
Political Parties Campaign in Europe as they do in North America, 6 INT’L DATA PRIV. L.
261 (2016); Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861
(2014); Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voting Public: Leveraging Personal
Information to Construct Voter Preference, in BIG DATA, POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING AND THE
LAW (Normann Witzleb, et. Al ed., Routledge 2020) (2020).
14
DEBORAH G. JOHNSON & PRISCILLA M. REGAN, TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE
AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: A HOUSE OF MIRRORs (New York: Routledge, 2014).
15
Alice E. Marwick & Danah Boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate
Context in Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA AND 1051, 1052 (2015).
16
REGAN, supra note 8, at 243; Priscilla M. Regan, Privacy and the Common Good:
Revisited, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Beate
Roessler & Dorota Mokrosinska eds., 2015).
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and activities. The argument offered in this paper is that if policy effectively
addresses the second concern, privacy intrusions, it will also address to some
extent the first, anti-competitive behavior, and third, misinformation or “fake
news,” concerns. Imagine a Venn diagram of these three policy arguments
or arenas. Data about individuals is the intersection in the middle of the
diagram.
The first concern involves the real or potential anti-competitive
behavior of key internet gatekeepers, especially internet service providers
(herein “ISPs”), but also what are sometimes referred to as edge players/
platforms, including Google, Facebook, and Amazon. These two sets of
actors are currently regulated by different agencies: the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) has jurisdiction over ISPs, but not over
platforms, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over
“unfair and deceptive trade practices” of platforms, but not ISPs.17 Much of
the debate about anti-competitive behavior has focused on the policy
solution of “net neutrality”—the idea that providers of internet content
should not be discriminated against in their ability to provide offerings to
consumers and that users should have equal access to see any legal content
they choose.18 Evidence of horizontal and vertical consolidation of large
online platforms and consolidation of ISPs has generated concern about
possible blocking or discriminating amongst customers. For example,
among ISPs, Time Warner Cable merged with Charter Communications in
2015, AT&T merged with Direct TV in 2015 and Time Warner in 2018, and
Verizon merged with XO Communications in 2017. Among internet
platforms, Google has acquired YouTube, Doubleclick, ITA, Waxe, and
AdMob, while Facebook has acquired Instagram and WhatsApp, among
others, and Amazon has acquired Whole Foods and Zappos. Net neutrality
principles require ISPs to charge all content providers similarly and not to
privilege large providers and customers to the detriment of smaller providers.
In the U.S., debate over net neutrality has been contentious and partisan. In
2005, the FCC adopted a form of net neutrality or non-discrimination
guidelines; from 2006 to 2009, Congress unsuccessfully considered a
number of net neutrality rules; and in 2010, a Circuit Court ruled that the
FCC did not have the authority to regulate ISPs.19 In 2015, the FCC
approved net neutrality rules, which were upheld by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit as within the FCC’s jurisdiction, but then

17
Jeffrey A. Eisenach and Ilene Knable Gotts, Looking Ahead: The FTC’s Role in
Information Technology Markets, 83 GEO WASH L. REV. (2015) 1876–1901.
18
Jan Kramer, Lukas Wiewiorra, and Christoff Weinhardt, Net Neutrality: A Progress
Report, 37 TELECOMM. POL’Y REV. (2013): 794–813.
19
Jeffrey A. Hart, The Net Neutrality Debate in the United States, 8 J. OF INFO. TECH. &
POL. 418–443 (2015).
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repealed by the FCC in December 2017. On April 10, 2019, the House on a
party-line vote reinstated net neutrality rules, which are unlikely to be passed
by the Senate. California passed a net neutrality law in October 2018, which
was challenged by the U.S. Department of Justice.
The second concern addresses the commodification of personal
information and ubiquity of privacy intrusions. As discussed above, the
policy solution of FIPPs is increasingly questioned and new approaches are
being proposed. For example, in May of 2018, the European Union
instituted a more active regulatory stance in the General Data Protection
Regulation (herein “GDPR”) which, among other things, requires all
companies processing the personal data of data subjects residing in the
Union, regardless of the company’s location to: request consent in an
intelligible and easily accessible form, with the purpose for data processing
duly noted; provide notifications of data breaches without undue delay;
supply a free electronic copy of all personal data held by the controller; and
entitle the data subject to have the data controller erase his/her personal data,
cease further dissemination of the data, and potentially have third parties halt
processing of the data.20 Additionally, Article 22 of the GDPR prohibits the
use of automated/algorithmic decision-making that produces “legally
significant” or “similar effects,” unless a human is involved in the process.21
The institution of the GDPR, combined with continuing reports of largescale data breaches, increased attention to potential discriminatory effects of
algorithms, and the introduction of new products that are reliant upon the use
of personal information, have generated renewed policy discussions in the
U.S. as well. In 2018, California passed the California Consumer Privacy
Act (herein “CCPA”) (effective January 2020) that mirrors many of the
requirements of the GDPR and adopts a more regulatory approach than
traditional FIPPSs.22 A number of congressional committees have held
hearings, and several bills were introduced in 2018-2019, but all have stalled
in committee.23
The third concern involves the explosion of inaccurate or biased
information particularly on social media and blog sites and its influence in
shaping the democratic process, not just in one country, but globally, through
20
General Data Protection Directive, Intersoft Consulting, https://gdpr-info.eu/. (last
visited 2020).
21
Id.
22
For discussion of the differences between the GDPR and CCPA, see Anupam
Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, GEO. L.
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER WORKS 2190 (2019).
23
See, e.g., Senator Wyden’s Consumer Data Protection Act; Senator Schatz’s Data
Care Act; Senator Rubio’s American Data Dissemination Act; Senators Markey and
Blumenthal’s CONSENT Act; and Senator Klobuchar’s Social Media and Privacy Protection
and Consumer Rights Act. See Chander, supra note 22, at pp. 34–35 for a more complete list.
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the messages that are circulated to subsets of the population who are most
likely to be interested in or influenced by those particular messages. Concern
about this issue intensified following the 2016 election in the U.S. as well as
European elections and the rise of more radical right thinking around the
world. These discussions have focused on the knotty and unpopular question
of censoring information—a policy that in the U.S. is abhorrent under the
First Amendment but is equally concerning in European countries. One
critical issue, if any form of censorship is entertained, is who should be the
appropriate party to make decisions about taking down internet content—the
government, the company, or an objective third party?
The key policy question seems to be not whether the powerful players
on the internet should be regulated, but instead how best to regulate them.
This sentiment was expressed by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg in answering
a question posed by Senator Graham before the Senate Judiciary and Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation committees when Zuckerberg
replied “I think the real question, as the internet becomes more important in
people’s lives is what’s the right regulation?”24 Part of the difficulty in
answering this question has focused on determining what kind of entity these
major internet players are—are they media companies, technology
companies, financial companies, publishing companies or some new hybrid?
How this question is answered will determine whether major internet players
are bound by the rules and oversight of the FTC, FCC, the Federal Elections
Commission (FEC), or some other regulatory agency. Or perhaps a new
entity designed to address the specific complications of their business
models and activities is necessary altogether. The next section presents the
argument that if policymakers focus holistically on the problem of internet
privacy and on the development of effective policy solutions for this
problem, these solutions will also serve to minimize and curtail the problems
of misinformation and “fake news” on the internet and will at least mitigate
some of the issues associated with anti-competitive behavior by large
internet actors.
IV. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF PROTECTING INFORMATION PRIVACY
It is widely recognized that the business models of large internet
companies rely upon the collection, use, and analysis of personal
information. In exchange for “free” services—such as search engines, email,
social networking connections, and navigation systems—individuals
provide their personal information as they begin a relationship with the
service and subsequently reveal their activities to the companies as they use
24
Aja Romano, Don’t Ask Whether Facebook Can Be Regulated. Ask Which Facebook
to Regulate, VOX (2018), https://www.vox.com/technology/2018/4/12/17224096/regulatingfacebook-problems.
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that service. The data that companies acquire from their users enables them
to refine the services they offer and to offer new or related services.
Information about one person is also analyzed against the information of
others who are similarly situated or whose activities or characteristics
interact with that person. This enables internet companies to expand their
insights into someone’s preferences or needs by virtue of information about
others whom the person associates with or resembles in some way and thus
to make more and/or more refined offerings to the person.
The commodification of personal information and the information
asymmetries of the personal information market that currently exists
between individuals and internet companies are profound and obviate any
ability for individuals to effectively exercise control over the use of their
information. The economics or market context in which personal privacy is
seemingly negotiated inevitably draws attention to a number of what might
be termed “market failures” including: asymmetries in knowledge about how
personal information flows, lack of transparency regarding data exchanges,
and lack of knowledge about the short-term and long-term implications and
costs to the individual.25 In the era of “big data” and social networking sites,
the personal information market is further complicated from a privacy
protection perspective because the actions of other individuals, with whom
one may or may not be associated, renders it impossible for individuals to
procure reliable and complete information on the implications of revealing
their information or engaging with a service that collects their information.
On a number of online platforms, in particular social networking sites, one’s
own information privacy is dependent upon one’s friends, friends of friends,
professional colleagues, fellow members of political and interest groups,
those who may have access to one’s information and, perhaps more
critically, those whose actions may affect the privacy of others in that
group.26 Moreover, these online platforms disclose information about your

25

Joshua A. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385
(2015),
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=dlj_online; A.
Michael. Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from
Environmental Impact Statements, U. ILL L. REV. 1713 (2015); Dennis D. Hirsch, Privacy,
Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Trust Commons: A Response to Professors Fairfield
and Engel, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67–93 (2016); Priscilla M. Regan, Response to Privacy as a
Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 51–65 (2016).
26
Mark MacCarthy, New Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and
Externalities, 6 ISJLP 425 (2011); Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run
Around Anonymity and Consent, in Julia Lane et. al., Privacy, Big Data, and the Public Good:
Frameworks for Engagement, CAMBRIDGE UNI. PRESS (2014); Paul Ohm, Changing the
Rules: General Principles for Data Use and Analysis, in Julia Lane et. al., Privacy, Big Data,
and the Public Good: Frameworks for Engagement, CAMBRIDGE UNI. PRESS (2014); Regan,
supra note 25.
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activities within what they define as your social circle—based on algorithmic
analyses and inferences about your preferences, social and political leanings,
activities, use of time, etc. Examples here abound. Eventbrite, Evite, and
other online invitation sites ask whether you want to see who else you know
is coming or simply inform you who is coming—sharing with you
information that these individuals likely did not know would be shared, as
well as providing incentives for you to attend depending on who else was
attending. Likewise, Instagram suggests people who you should follow—
not at the initiative or desire of the person but based on Instagram’s analysis
of who you follow and who they are following.
Not only is personal information commodified, it is then analyzed by
machine-based learning systems developed by data scientists to reveal even
more information. Use of this data and algorithmic tools for culling the data
are not restricted to nudging you within your social circle but, as was starkly
revealed with respect to Facebook’s activities in the 2016 American election,
have also reached into areas fundamental to democracy.27 These activities
involve sophisticated targeted messaging along the lines of behavioral
advertising commonly practiced in the commercial sector,28 which
companies argue are protected by the First Amendment.29 As the discussion
of policy problems posed by targeted messaging of biased or false
information to sway voters’ political views and votes ensues, the policy
solution receiving the most attention focuses on some form of censorship or
control over the content of messages. This has engendered further
disagreement about what type of entity would be most appropriate to exert
such control: the companies themselves, e.g., Facebook; a government body;
or some independent third party. Not surprisingly, political views also color
the debate and mask the pivotal role that personal information collection and
use plays in causing both fake news/misinformation and the power wielded
by major internet platforms.
The collection and use of data about individuals also play a pivotal role
in the competitive advantage of ISPs and large internet platforms. Although
ISPs appear not to have taken direct advantage of such information, the
potential for it to engage in offering auxiliary services to individual
customers or packaging such customers for online service providers does
exist. Large internet platforms, however, do clearly take advantage of what
they know about their customers in shaping the users’ experience. Such
27

See articles in Special Issue: Bennett, C. J. & Lyon, D. (2019). Data-driven elections:
implications and challenges for democratic societies. Internet Policy Review, 8(4).
DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1433
28
Burkell & Regan, supra note 13; Jacquelyn Burkell & Priscilla M. Regan, Voter
Preferences, Voter Manipulation, Voter Analytics: Policy Options for Less Surveillance and
More Autonomy, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 4 (2019).
29
Balkin, supra note 4.
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control of the users’ experience involves an analysis of all that the user has
done based on information about that user and inferences drawn based on
that information. As pointed out in Senator Warner’s draft white paper,
“Pervasive tracking may give platforms important behavioral information on
a consumer’s willingness to pay or on behavioral tendencies that can be
exploited to drive engagement with an app or service.”30
The 2006 observation of Clive Humby, U.K. mathematician and
architect of Tesco’s Clubcard, that, “Data is the new oil . . . It’s valuable, but
if unrefined it cannot really be used. It . . . must be broken down, analyzed
for it to have value,” has been often-repeated.31 His reference here is to data
about individuals and has fueled debates about what should be done to curtail
the power of companies like Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.
The Economist wrote in 2017:
Such dominance has prompted calls for the tech giants
to be broken up, as Standard Oil was in the early 20th
century. This newspaper has argued against such drastic
action in the past. Size alone is not a crime. The giants’
success has benefited consumers. Few want to live without
Google’s search engine, Amazon’s one-day delivery or
Facebook’s newsfeed. Nor do these firms raise the alarm
when standard antitrust tests are applied. Far from gouging
consumers, many of their services are free (users pay, in
effect, by handing over yet more data). Take account of
offline rivals, and their market shares look less worrying.
And the emergence of upstarts like Snapchat suggests that
new entrants can still make waves . . . . But there is cause
for concern. Internet companies’ control of data gives them
enormous power. Old ways of thinking about competition,
devised in the era of oil, look outdated in what has come to
be called the “data economy.” A new approach is needed.32
Implicit in the above is that the crux of the current problems associated
with these firms is the data about individuals that they have amassed directly,
indirectly, or by inference and that these firms can use to their competitive
advantage in terms of both offering products and services to individuals and
also undercutting business rivals. Personal data gives these firms the central
30
Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and
Technology
Firms,
White
Paper
3,
https://regmedia.co.uk/2018/07/30/warner_social_media_proposal.pdf.
31
See
Michael
Palmer,
Data
is
the
New
Oil,
https://ana.blogs.com/maestros/2006/11/data_is_the_new.html. (last visited 2020).
32
The World’s Most Valuable Resource is No Longer Oil, but Data, THE ECONOMIST
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuableresource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
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asset that they control. As Julie Cohen similarly notes, “the data extracted
from individuals plays an increasingly important role as raw material in the
political economy of informational capitalism.”33
V. SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE POLICY REGIME
Big data resources and applications have enhanced the power of
personal data in ways that have further challenged information privacy,
enhanced the competitive advantage of companies who control the data, and
enabled the targeting of messages to select individuals and groups. If big
data resources and applications have become integral to modern life, then the
organizations and transmission mechanisms that support big data take on the
features of an infrastructure.34 Scholars and policymakers are analyzing
these issues and offering a number of possible solutions, but often with a
focus on one of the problems such as competitive advantage, information
privacy, or targeted information. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth
Cukier recognize a more active role for government regulation to control
what they call the “data barons”—”[w]e must prevent the rise of the twentyfirst century robber barons who dominated America’s railroads, steel
manufacturing, and telegraph networks.”35 Additionally, they advocate for
the use of antitrust rules to curb abusive power and ensure conditions exist
to promote a competitive market for big data, a solution that Elizabeth
Warren as a 2020 Democratic presidential candidate has also called for
Amazon, Facebook, and Google.36 Most recently, several state Attorney
Generals have begun investigations into antitrust violations by Facebook and
Google.37 In 2014, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (herein “PCAST”) suggested a policy solution similar to
“trusted third party” options, which could establish and monitor privacypreference profiles and also review new data collection and use applications
to determine how they fit within each of the profiles.38 Balkin proposed an
“information fiduciaries” scheme that would require ISPs and major online
33

Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, supra note 7.
DEBORAH G. JOHNSON & PRISCILLA M. REGAN, POLICY OPTIONS FOR RECONFIGURING
THE MIRRORS, IN TRANSPARENCY AND SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIOTECHNICAL ACCOUNTABILITY:
A HOUSE OF MIRRORS (2014).
35
Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 10, at 183.
36
Matt Stevens, Elizabeth Warren on Breaking Up Big Tech, N.Y. TIMES (June 26,
2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/26/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-break-up-amazonfacebook.html.
37
Steve Lohr, New Google and Facebook Inquiries Show Big Tech Scrutiny is
Bipartisan
Act,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2019)
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/technology/attorney-generals-tech-antitrustinvestigation.html.
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President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, Big Data and Privacy:
A Technological Perspective, at 37 (May 2014).
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platforms to abide by terms of trust and confidence protecting users and limit
what organizations can do with user data.39 Daniel Greenwood, at the MIT
Media Lab, and colleagues suggest the establishment of a “trust network” as
a system of data sharing, “elegantly integrating computer and legal rules,
allows automatic auditing of data use and allows individuals to change their
permissions and withdraw data.”40
In 2018, Senator Mark Warner issued a White Paper proposing a
number of policy options including one to label certain services, such as
Google, as “essential services,” a designation that would require internet
platforms to provide access to these services on “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” terms (hereinafter “FRAND”) and prevent them from
“engaging in self-dealing or preferential conduct.”41 Daniel Crane, an
antitrust law professor, raises issues with enforcement of potential FRAND
obligations:
Another key issue with FRAND commitments or
obligations—one not addressed in the white paper—is what
institution has jurisdiction to determine when the dominant
firm has failed to honor the FRAND obligation . . . . Courts
are generally very bad at setting terms of dealing . . . .
Regulatory agencies might take it up, but there is no agency
with the obvious expertise or resources to decide what terms
online platforms should have to offer third parties.42
To this point, Hal Singer, an antitrust economist, suggests the
establishment of a new independent “Net Tribunal”43 to police
discriminatory conduct by dominant tech platforms—and potentially internet
service providers. Arguing that anti-trust law does not provide an effective
solution, his proposal entails:
[A]n alternative, ex post regime patterned loosely on
the tribunal used to adjudicate discrimination complaints
against cable video operators pursuant to Section 616 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 (herein “Cable Act”). Although that tribunal
operates under the Federal Communications Commission,
the proposed tribunal here could be independent, as are

39

Balkin, supra note 4.
Daniel Greenwood et al., The New Deal on Data: A Framework for Institutional
Controls, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 192,
198 (Julie Lane et al. eds., 2014).
41
Warner, supra note 30, at 23.
42
Asher Schechter, Would Sen. Warner’s Ambitious Plan to Regulate Social Media
Giants “Ruin” the Internet—Or Save it?, PROMARKET (August 13, 2018).
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Article I courts, operating free from reversals by political
appointees at federal agencies.44
Sabeel Rahman, at Brooklyn Law School, begins to develop a scheme
to modify classic public utility regulatory tools to achieve accountability for
internet platforms to meet standards of fair access and treatment, and
protection of users. However, he notes the challenging choices in terms of
whether to provide for institutional oversight regulation by government,
private actors or some hybrid or provide for structural regulation by
addressing business models and market dynamics (2018).45
Currently, there is no lack of suggested regulatory and legal suggestions
to tackle this problem. Not surprisingly, no single suggestion seems
perfectly designed to combat the complexity of one of the current internet
issues, much less to address all three. As Singer notes, “the internet is not
one thing—it is many things, and our current regulatory regimes are
struggling to address that complexity.”46 There is no question that regulators
are struggling and not doing very well in this struggle. The 2015 net
neutrality rules were repealed in December 2017, removing FCC jurisdiction
over ISPs and reclassifying them as “information services” rather than
“telecommunications services.”47 In effect, this returns jurisdiction over
them to the FTC, which not only has its plate full, but also only has the power
to act with ex post authority, the power to respond primarily to egregious
cases or patterns of “deceptive and unfair trade practices,” and does not have
the rulemaking power. Congress is currently considering proposals to
broaden FTC powers, but as exemplified by a recent hearing held in late
September 2018, major internet companies—including AT&T, Apple,
Amazon, Google, and Twitter—support increased staff and funding for the
FTC but not enhanced legal authority.48
In an interesting recent essay, Frank Pasquale, a law professor at the
University of Maryland, portrays this modern debate as one between
Jeffersonians, advocating use of antitrust laws, and Hamiltonians,
advocating specific rules to curb abuses of corporate powers. The author
notes:
It will be politically difficult to “unscramble the
omelet” of currently dominant firms. Authorities are wary
44

Singer, supra note 7.
See generally K. Sabeel Rahman, Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet
Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234–251 (2018).
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Singer, supra note 7.
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Restoring Internet Freedom, FED. COMM. COMM’N, FCC 17-166 (adopted Dec. 14,
2017).
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Examining Safeguards for Consumer Data Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Com., Sci., and Tech., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Sen. John Thune, Chairman, S.
Comm. on Com., Sci., and Tech.).
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of reversing mergers and acquisitions, even when they are
obviously problematic in hindsight. While Jeffersonians
may keep our digital giants from getting bigger,
Hamiltonians will need to monitor the current practices of
these firms and intervene when they transgress social
norms.49
Given the partisanship in Washington, the reluctance of internet firms to
succumb to regulation, and the prevailing sense that there should not be a
rush to regulate but instead a need to get it “right,” it is likely that debates
about what actions to take will drag on for some time. Meanwhile, current
practices will continue to be unchecked, intensifying concerns about privacy,
competition, and misinformation. Yet again, hindsight will likely reveal that
something should have been done sooner.
The hindsight revelation may be reminiscent of the proposal for a
Federal Privacy Board that was included in the original version of the
Privacy Act of 1974 proposed by Senator Ervin. The question of an
independent privacy agency was a point of contention even before the
congressional hearings. Both the Westin/Baker study50 (1972) and the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) advisory committee51
(1973) recommended against the establishment of a commission—and in
congressional hearings all federal agencies and many private sector
organizations voiced opposition as well. Although the Senate bill provided
for the establishment of a Privacy Protection Commission, the House bill did
not. The final bill established a Privacy Protection Study Commission
(herein “PPSC”), which concluded in its 1977 report that existing federal
agencies with regulatory authority over certain areas, such as the FTC would
be appropriate control mechanisms.52 As information practices have become
more sophisticated and as other countries have established such agencies,
proposals to establish a privacy commission of some type in the U.S. are
raised—but have never garnered significant support or serious consideration.
However, the time might be right for serious consideration of a welldesigned privacy board or commission that is premised on the concept that
internet actors have a duty to act as “public trustees” in their processing of
personal data. This might provide an appropriate solution for a number of
reasons. First, the focus is on information practices which, as argued above,

49

Frank Pasquale, Tech Platforms and the Knowledge Problem, 2 AMERICAN AFFAIRS
14 (2018).
50
ALAN F. WESTIN AND MICHAEL BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS,
RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY (1972).
51
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
52
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY (1977).
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address privacy concerns, anti-competitive potential, and misinformation
spread. Second, it embraces time-honored principles of “public interest,
convenience and necessity” from early communications regulation under the
FCC and recognition of “essential services” operating under “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” terms from antitrust regulation. Third,
it acknowledges the fundamental connection between privacy and trust
necessary in the information economy,53 and would move privacy principles
“from procedural means of compliance for data extraction towards
substantive principles to build trusted, sustainable information
relationships.”54 With an emphasis on data holders as public trustees, policy
discussions would shift from focusing on the negative effects of information
collection and use to determining what kinds of information practices serve
a public interest in an information economy.55 Fourth, it need not, and should
not, entail a static, one-size fits all, innovation-stifling approach, but permits
flexibility and learning instead—especially in areas such as the use of
algorithms.
The design of such an agency is without question a challenge—
especially in today’s anti-regulatory environment with high levels of distrust
in government. The data protection agencies of Europe and the privacy
commission in Canada may provide templates that can be borrowed from
and modified, especially based on their experiences with what has been
effective and what has not.56 However, the policy problem the agency seeks
to address is not privacy per se, but on controlling the private power of
internet actors, a power largely premised on their collection and analysis of
personal data, which has spawned three inter-related problems: privacy,
anticompetitive behavior, and misinformation.
Before tackling the question of how such an agency might be designed,
let me first note that my focus is on the agency, not the standards or rules
that the agency would be charged to implement. As noted above, there are
numerous congressional bills and congressional testimonies discussing what
rules, principles, or standards should be included in legislation. However,
although as Cameron Kerry points out, there is much agreement on the key
principles, nonetheless, “it is a challenge to articulate these in ways that are
concrete without being too prescriptive or too narrow.”57 Although the
53

Regan, supra note 10; Richards & Woodward, supra note 3; Hirsch, supra note 25.
Richards & Woodward, supra note 3.
55
Regan, supra note 10.
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See Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy
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question of standards or principles is not my focus, as noted above, the
shortcomings of the FIPPs approach requires a shift in policy thinking to
obligate organizations to responsibly handle personal information. In setting
such obligations or duties, it is first important to point out that the target of
inquiry here is large organizational entities, or the “data barons” if you will,
and not small, local organizations that have information on a limited number
of customers or members with whom they have a direct and somewhat
limited relationship.58 Additionally, in setting obligations and duties, Margot
Kaminski’s conclusion that “both the current penalties and the current levels
and kinds of uncertainty in the U.S. privacy regime are not enough to drive
industry to the table in efficiency-maximizing ways” is important to
consider.59 She argues that effective policy will require broad standards
backed by enforcement; ensuring that there is uncertainty over what the
standards require and therefore driving companies to negotiate with the
enforcement agency.60 The discussion below regarding the design of a new
agency assumes that Congress does pass legislation setting out broad, rather
than specific, principles that would serve as a baseline for agency
deliberations.
Second, this article takes the position that a new agency is needed to
take the lead in these areas although it should, as will be discussed below,
work with, not against, the existing agencies. At this point, a number of
federal agencies exercise some jurisdiction over personal information
practices in different sectors, such as the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) over health information and Department of Education over
student information. Generally, the FTC is recognized as the leading agency
on privacy, but its powers in the privacy and security realm are not as
extensive (for example, rulemaking power) as needed. In a fairly exhaustive
analysis of FTC privacy actions, Daniel Solove and Woodward Hartzog
found that FTC actions demonstrate “quite thick” jurisprudence, which has
features of a “robust regulatory privacy regime.”61 As they also note,
however, not all companies are required to or do have privacy policies
enabling FTC jurisdiction, and FTC actions generally result in settlements,

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/01/07/will-this-new-congress-be-the-one-topass-data-privacy-legislation/.
58
California’s CCPA excludes companies with less than $25 million in annual gross
income and Senator Wyden’s proposed Consumer Data Privacy Act does not cover businesses
below a certain size—less than $50 million in average annual receipts and not collecting
information on over 1 million people and devices. See Chander, supra note 22, fn.189.
59
Margot E. Kaminski, When the Default is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the
NTIA, 94 DEN. L. REV. 925, 946 (2016).
60
Id.
61
Daniel Solove and Woodward Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 583–86 (2014).
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which do not always generate an open record.62 They conclude their analysis
by saying that, “the FTC has not fully exerted its powers or pushed the
logical ex-tensions of its theories” and could expand its powers beyond
privacy policies.63 In a subsequent article, they similarly point to the
nimbleness of the FTC, its tradition of working well with other agencies with
overlapping mandates, and its ability to be flexible in determining harms, but
fault it for being “quite conservative” and “more of a norm-codifier than
norm-maker”64 and ask it to be “bolder and more aggressive[.]”65
Moreover, a new agency would not only be better positioned to counter
the weaknesses of the FTC but would also better address the range of
concerns about information flows that lead not only to privacy and security
issues, but also unfair competition and disinformation on the internet.
Additionally, its orientation would be broader than legal, allowing it to be
nimbler than the FTC. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the FTC was
founded in 1914 and designed for the problems of an earlier age—its
mission, organizational culture, and statute have adapted somewhat to the
challenges of the information age.66 But at the same time, there is arguably
a historical drag, a tendency towards following standard operating
procedures, and a legalistic culture that constrains its ability to approach the
complexity of the problems of the information age with a fresh perspective.
VI. DESIGNING A TRUST AGENCY
There are several inter-related features that are likely to be critical both
to support for an agency charged with regulating internet actors so that they
act as trustees of the public interest and to the success of an agency in
achieving this goal. The first two involve the name and position of the
agency in the federal structure, and the following five directly address
designing the agency to avoid capture by regulated industries and overpoliticization by partisan interests.
The first is the name of the agency. The policy goal to which the agency
is to be committed is to require large internet actors to act as public trustees,
and the name of the agency should reflect that—possibly the “Data Trustee
Board” or the “Data Trust and Integrity Board.” In this sense, it should be
framed more like the National Institute of Standards and Technology (herein
“NIST”), which ensures the technical integrity of the internet, but with a
62
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focus on the internet’s data integrity. Privacy is one—albeit, critically
important—aspect of data integrity, but experience has demonstrated that
privacy has not provided a compelling narrative that the public truly
embraces, as it can be undermined by simplified notions of “having nothing
to hide,” and privacy is a multi-faceted concept that encompasses several
important interests that may be under-appreciated by grouping them under
privacy. The agency title should both better convey the policy goal being
protected and should take advantage of the opportunity to reframe the policy
issue.
The second is the placement of the agency in the federal organizational
structure. At this point, there are a number of agencies that share jurisdiction
over pieces of the three issues involving personal information flows that are
examined in this paper—privacy intrusions, anti-competitive behavior, and
misinformation or “fake news.” Given the range of issues, the technical
sophistication of information practices, and the desire to move beyond a
legalistic framework, one option might be to house the new agency as a
separate agency in the Department of Commerce, along with NIST and
NTIA.
Given the past success of large internet actors to lobby successfully
against any form of government regulation and the expertise that internet
actors have over the dynamics of the flows of personal information, the
primary design challenge in establishing this agency is to provide it with the
institutional capacity to avoid being captured by the industries it is to
regulate and to insulate it from becoming politicized while also empowering
it to collaborate with those industries. This is no small task, but much has
been written in both administrative law and political science about regulatory
capture that offers some guidance in this area; however, the dynamics of
capture will be contextual varying in the structure of the interest group
environment and the partisan positions on regulation. Put most simply,
“capture describes situations where organized interest groups successfully
act to vindicate their goals through government policy at the expense of the
public interest.”67 Scott Hempling points out that regulatory capture is
neither corruption nor control but is essentially an attitude on the part of the
regulated entities where the regulators are biased or constantly persuaded by
the identity or position of the regulated rather than the merits of any
arguments about the need or contours of regulation, which becomes
“reflected in a surplus of passivity and reactivity, and a deficit of curiosity

67

Michael A. Livermore and Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013); Ryan Bubb & Patrick L. Warren, Optimal
Agency Bias and Regulatory Review 38 (New York Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-47, 2013).
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and creativity.”68 He goes on to argue that,
[A]n agency is susceptible to capture when there are:
(a) policy voids instead of vision; (b) priorities and
procedures that reflect parties’ requests rather than public
interest needs; (c) chronic resource differentials between the
regulator and regulated; and (d) fair-weather politicians
whose support for regulation sags when pressured by those
who would weaken it.69
David Freeman Engstrom differentiates two types of capture, both of which
are likely to bedevil regulation of internet actors. The first, materialist, or
classic, captures that which involves asymmetric stakes among groups,
collective action problems, and structural problems. Second, a newer, nonmaterialist, view of capture entailing dominance of ideas that “what is good
for Wall Street is good for America.”70
Given the largely self-regulatory stance that the government has taken
to this point regarding internet actors and the scale and complexity of their
business models, the mandate of an independent agency in this area should
not be to oversee that organizations are abiding by detailed rules and to mete
out punishment. Instead, its mandate should be to work somewhat more
collaboratively with internet actors to understand the goals of personal data
practices, to identify consequences (intended and unintended) of those
practices, and to evaluate whether the practices are consistent with the
“public interest, convenience and necessity.” Its mandate should not be to
stifle innovation, but to ensure socially responsible innovation. Lessons and
insights from co-regulation attempts in the U.S. and Europe offer some
guidance as to what to avoid and what to add71 so that an agency will need
to have sufficient authority and stature to require an internet actor to modify
or cease a data practice that is not in the public interest.
So, how might an agency be designed to avoid being captured or
politicized while at the same time being able to maintain a collaborative
relationship with the regulated industries and the trust of the public? These
goals are somewhat overlapping in that features of institutional structures
and capacities can address more than one goal. The key design challenges
68
Scott Hempling, Regulatory Capture, 1 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE &
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 23, 25 (2014).
69
Id. at 33.
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David Freeman Engstrom, Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 31, 32
(2013)
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U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 166 (2013); David Thaw, Enlightened
Regulatory Capture, 89 WASH. L. REV. 329, 377 (2014).
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include decisions about: (1) whether the agency should have a single or
multi-member head, the length of terms of service, and the conditions under
which the head(s) of agencies can be removed; (2) what is the funding source
for the agency; (3) how can the agency marshal the expertise that it needs to
regulate; (4) what are the relationships of the agency with other federal
agencies, as well as state actors and public advocates; (5) how transparent is
the decision-making of the agency; and (6) what is the ability of the agency
to generate the information it needs to regulate effectively?
A. Agency Leadership
There are advantages as well as disadvantages to both single member
and multi-member agency leadership.72 Single member heads, particularly
with longer terms of service (five to seven years, for example) provide a clear
point of authority, enabling the agency to act quickly and decisively, and
some insulation from the politics of the day, as well as providing a single
point of accountability to the public. At the same time, single member heads
arguably have too much independent authority. Multi-member heads with
overlapping terms of service generally entail different perspectives and
involve a certain amount of bargaining, negotiating, and compromise to
reach decisions, thus providing a type of internal check and balance. The
Consumer Financial Protection Board (herein “CFPB”) and the Federal
Housing Financial Agency (herein “FHFA”), both of which were established
in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, are single-member heads with five
year terms with Presidential removal only for cause (e.g., inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance). However, the constitutionality of single
member heads for both the CFPB and FHFA has been challenged on the
basis that it entails too much independence from political control, especially
when combined with a source of funding independent of the appropriations
process.73 Given this constitutional uncertainty, it is likely wise to establish
a multi-member leadership structure with overlapping five-year terms and
removal only for well-defined cause, with some combination of
congressional and presidential appointment.
B. Funding Source
Given the vast financial resources of major internet actors and the lack
of detailed information about their business models, an independent source
72

See generally Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL. L. REV. 769 (2013).
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of funding for this new agency seems to be a critical factor in ensuring that
the agency would avoid both capture and politicization. There are two ways
to ensure some financial independence for an agency. The first is to enable
agencies to submit their budget proposals directly to Congress bypassing
OMB; this eliminates the executive’s ability to change the agency’s request,
but still leaves it open to congressional wrangling. The second, and more
effective alternative, is to provide agencies with an independent source of
funding, such as by requiring the regulated entities to pay mandatory fees to
the agency. As Rachel Barkow points out, the Federal Reserve’s funding is
through assessments on member banks, and the Office of Thrift Supervision,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and CFPB are similarly
funded; this insulates the agencies from both congressional and presidential
influence.74 Charles Kruly similarly points that “when Congress combines
self-funding with other traditional indicia of agency independence—
typically, structural features that insulate an agency from executive
control—Congress creates what are likely the most structurally independent
agencies in the federal government;”75 however, he goes on to note the
importance of other structural features in ensuring this independence.
C. Expertise
Providing the agency with a level of expertise so that it can evaluate
what the industries say is also critical to maintaining independence and
avoiding capture and politicization. This can be achieved both at the
leadership level and at the staff level. In this case, the leadership and staff
of the agency should also be interdisciplinary and include, for example,
technologists, data scientists, ethicists, and social scientists, with lawyers
kept to a minimum. Presidential or congressional appointees can be required
to have certain qualifications, which then somewhat mitigates partisan
influence. This is not an unusual requirement for agencies where scientific
or technical expertise is important—for example, by statute, the leadership
of the Food and Drug Administration requires scientific expertise, the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board requires “respected experts in the
field of nuclear safety,” the Commissioner of the Consumer Product Safety
Board cannot hold the office of Commissioner if he or she is “in the employ
of, or holding any official relation to, any person engaged in selling or
manufacturing consumer products” or owns “stock or bonds of substantial
value in a person so engaged” or “is in any other manner pecuniarily
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interested in such a person.”76 Similar requirements can be established for
staff. Initially, it may also be wise to detail staff from other federal agencies
with jurisdiction in this area, such as the FTC, FCC and NTIA, which would
transfer not only a degree of expertise but also some measure of institutional
memory to the new agency.
D. Relationships with Federal, State, and Public Actors
This brings us to the question of the relationships of the new agency
with other federal agencies, as well as state actors and public advocates. The
issues of online privacy, net neutrality, and online speech have spawned a
cottage industry of potential and actual regulators, as well as a range of
industry and public interest groups. This is already a crowded field, with the
FTC, FCC, and NTIA, as well as Department of Education and HHS, already
having some jurisdiction, but as the earlier analysis indicates the field is not
one where there is clear leadership and one where there is need for more
coordination and authority to act. Rather than resist the existing
governmental actors in this area, a new agency could utilize their support,
working collaboratively with these agencies. But, as Rachel Barkow argues,
the new agency would need to be defined as having primary responsibility:
It is all too easy for agencies to point fingers at each
other with no one ultimately held accountable. Indeed, that
scenario is eerily similar to the lead-up to the recent
financial crisis, with each over-lapping regulatory agency
essentially casting blame on others. To remedy this risk and
achieve a check on capture, the insulated agency should be
designated as the primary enforcer to ensure greater
accountability and to increase the incentives for the
responsible agency to take action.77
Designating the new agency as primary is likely to generate opposition from
the large internet actors, who at this point are quite comfortable with having
the FTC as the primary agency in this area and are supportive of more staff
for the FTC, but not more enforcement power. However, indicating the new
agency as the primary agency is critical to its effectiveness. The new
agency’s relationships with state actors are likely to be easier to navigate.
As Barkow points out in guidance on how to design institutions to avoid
capture, allowing state Attorneys General (AG) to also bring enforcement
actions can be an effective check against capture and protects against
underenforcement of regulations. AG involvement provides an additional
level of protection against the possibility that federal agencies bow to the
76
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President’s priorities, which may be dictated by powerful interest groups.78
Professor Danielle Citron has carefully documented the activities of AGs in
privacy and security issues and concludes that they have responded quickly
to consumer privacy concerns in part because they are less constrained by
“bureaucratic wrangling.”79 Citron also notes that AGs have institutionalized
collaboration about best practices and emerging risks in the monthly
telephone calls of the NAAG Privacy Working Group.80 A new agency
would also be able to work with this Group on a regular basis.
Institutionalizing collaboration with public advocates is another design
feature to avoid capture and over-politicization. There are a range of public
interest groups, including most prominently the ACLU, CDT, EPIC, and
EFF, that are concerned with privacy and security, anti-competitive behavior
of internet actors, net neutrality, and disinformation on the internet. There
are a number of ways that these groups might be formally, as well as
informally, involved in a new agency’s activities. Examples might include
membership on an advisory committee that meets regularly or a formal
position of public advocate to represent “the public’s interest before the
agency.”81 Additionally, the new agency might institutionalize a similar type
of involvement for privacy professionals “on the ground” and for the
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP).82 The richness
and robustness of the interest groups in this area should be an asset for the
new agency. Further, institutionalizing collaboration with these groups is an
important buffer against industry capture and over-politicization.
E. Transparency and Information Generation
Given that the mandate of the new agency is to act as a public trustee,
maintaining the transparency of the agency’s work is a priority and is also a
protection against capture and politicization. As Barkow argues:
[O]ne of the most powerful weapons policy makers can
give agencies is the ability to generate and disseminate
information that is politically powerful . . . . The key is to
give the agency the authority to study and publicize data that
will be of interest to the public and help energize the public
to overcome collective action problems and rally behind the
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agency.83
Policy and decision processes of the agency should be open to the public
utilizing traditional Administrative Procedure Act (APA) practices regarding
notice and comment periods for proposed regulations. As Engstrom points
out, the transparency and pluralistic participation required by rulemaking is
more insulated from regulated interest group influence and bolsters
congressional oversight by providing “fire alarms,”84 using a distinction
developed by McCubbins and Schwartz.85 Consistent with this, proposed
regulations should not be subject to review by OMB’s Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) providing protection against both capture
and politicization. Likewise, decisions regarding industry practices that
allegedly violate information practice regulations should be made publicly
available.
Two additional design features can enhance traditional agency
transparency requirements.
The first, as Barkow suggests, is the
establishment of a research arm within agencies—an idea that is very
suitable in this instance, especially in the area of big data and algorithms.86
This is consistent with Orley Lobel’s argument that, in dealing with
regulation of platforms, “regulatory agencies should view themselves not
merely as reactive enforcers, but also as active researchers of these
changes.”87 Another design feature is the utilization of third-party auditors,
which also would provide a means of gaining information about how internet
actors are using algorithms. As Lesley McAllister explains, “private thirdparty verifiers essentially act in the place of governmental agents to conduct
inspections and make regulatory compliance determinations. Governmental
agencies, in turn, take on new roles in coordinating and overseeing these
private actors. As a form of public-private governance, third-party
verification may further the goals of social regulation.”88 Although this may
reduce the direct costs to a government agency, it establishes a longer chain
of accountability and requires careful oversight both of the third-party
verifiers and the industry. It has the advantage, however, of providing a
means to extract relevant information.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica debacle, somewhat
bizarre censoring actions on the part of social media companies leading up
to the mid-term elections, heightened public concern about algorithmic
decision-making, and increased concentration among major internet actors.
There may actually be a window to engage the complexity of controlling the
private power of major internet actors rather than endorse incremental policy
changes that are destined to be ineffective. Until now, as Julie Cohen aptly
puts it, “Law for the platform economy is already being written—not via
discrete, purposive changes, but rather via the ordinary, uncoordinated but
self-interested efforts of information-economy participants and the lawyers
and lobbyists they employ.”89 Much of the congressional debate, as well as
the public debate, has coalesced around proposals to strengthen the role of
the FTC and to provide more effective “notice and choice” to consumers—
both of which fail to understand the larger economic changes that have taken
place in the platform-based economy and the dominance of large internet
actors.
In this paper, I have advanced two related arguments. The first is that
the current unchecked flows of personal information have not only caused
privacy and security problems but have also played pivotal roles in causing
fake news and misinformation and increasing the power of major internet
platforms. If policy addresses this underlying cause effectively, then such
policy would not only address information privacy issues, but also
ameliorate or mitigate the issues associated with anti-competitive behavior
by ISPs and internet platforms, and with misinformation and fake news. My
second argument is that the effectiveness of policy in this area hinges on the
establishment of a new agency designed to avoid capture by the regulated
industries and over-politicization by partisan interests.
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